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ABSTRACT 
 
A novel method for gamma-ray imaging of isotope separations is tested 
and validated.  Current methods of validating separation processes involve taking 
samples or gamma-ray counting before and after a process has occurred.  The 
method presented offers individuals or agencies the ability to verify that a 
process has occurred by watching the process instead of the precursors and 
products of the process. 
 
The goal of this method is to establish a means to evaluate the adherence 
to an approved isotope separation process quickly and safely with minimal 
interpretation needed by the user. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
 
1.1 The Need for Stand-Off Detection of Radiological 
Materials  
 
Accounting for radiological material has been a challenge for governments and 
agencies since the discovery of these useful isotopes.  Useful isotopes in the 
pre-war era would have included industrially useful compounds including radium, 
however the greater multitude of isotopes available following the introduction of 
nuclear reactors have increased the complexity of the accountability task.  While 
there are legitimate uses for these materials, there are countless nefarious uses 
for the same material, which can have devastating effects when used in even 
small quantities.  While gram quantities are not necessarily themselves a direct 
threat to national security, the damaging social consequences of even a small 
mass of material cannot be overlooked. 
 
To counter this threat, countless detection systems have become commonplace 
in facilities that handle radioactive material.  Detection systems in these facilities 
range from simple hand-held devices to whole body counting systems.  
Furthermore, not only are the detection systems broad in scope, but their 
application is just as diverse.  From hospitals to national laboratories across the 
world stand-off detection is used to ensure more unauthorized movement of 
radiological material. 
 
The purpose of these systems is two-fold.  Not only do they provide safeguards 
for public health and safety but perhaps more importantly, they help prevent 
unauthorized materials from leaving the facility. 
 
1.2 The Need for Monitoring the Diversion Pathways of 
Special Nuclear Material 
    
Diversion of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) can be accomplished in number of 
ways.  SNM is available for diversion before and after it enters a reactor, 
however if a reactor is available a greater number of diversion pathways open to 
a malicious actor. 
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Diversion of Enriched Uranium 
The effort required to enrich Uranium limits those who are able to accomplish this 
task.  However, once the process of enriching the material to a low level is 
perfected, the difficulty of continuing enrichment to higher levels becomes much 
easier.   
 
Piping in these enrichment facilities can be rearranged or changed in order to 
make a peaceful facility into a clandestine operation.  Various technological 
advances in facility mapping have helped ensure no unauthorized changes have 
been made to the original operational intent of the enrichment process.  
Inspection groups can use that same facility mapping process to verify the 
existence of diversion pathways that have been created within the architecture of 
the building. 
Diversion of Transuranic Elements and Post-Irradiation Uranium 
Generally, if a country has established a means of creating used nuclear fuel, 
their scientific prowess is sufficient to enable them to reprocess this fuel.  Such a 
situation would allow them to extract the SNM within.  Given the potential 
dangers that transuranic elements and the remaining uranium-235 (235U) pose to 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, any covert operation involving the use 
of these isotopes is unacceptable to the international community. 
 
Traditional methods of verifying the separation of industrially or commercially 
useful isotopes from the isotopes that present a proliferation concern would 
require either alpha particle or gamma-ray analysis.  The challenge surrounding 
these analytic methods is that they require a stop of operations while the 
samples are analyzed prior to continuing the separation.  Furthermore, these 
methods are not necessarily field deployable without significant resources. 
 
Given the verification requirements and challenges presented by the current 
verification methods, a verification method which allows for an in-situ validation of 
separations would be an invaluable tool for the safeguards community.  Not only 
would such a tool allow for greater deployability of verification teams, but also 
allow for more such teams to be fielded since a smaller logistical footprint is 
necessary for each unit. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
        
  
The ability to use the principle of Compton scattering has been theorized and 
applied within the past half-century.  In the past decade this Compton technology 
has been transformed from bulky, Dewar cooled high purity germanium crystals, 
to mechanically cooled, briefcase sized units capable of both detecting and 
subsequently localizing samples of gamma-ray emitting radioisotopes.   
 
2.1 Using standoff gamma-ray detection to localize 
radioisotopes 
 
While gamma-ray spectroscopy alone can be burdened by background radiation,  
gamma-ray imaging technology is potentially less sensitive to the same 
background noise [1].  
 
Facility Verification and Isotope Localization 
The use of facility mapping in recent years has been well documented and offers 
a great deal of progress in ensuring that facilities are used as intended.  Some of 
the earlier work in contemporary facility verification dealt with simply ensuring 
that an “as approved” design matched the “as built” facility.  Applications of this 
methodology were used on interior rooms, exterior facades, and aerial compound 
mapping [2].  Older methods might have involved comparing photographs of the 
facility over time, however modern methods allow for the use of laser range 
scanners with millimeters of resolution.  These mapping systems can be tripod, 
motor vehicle, or aircraft mounted and offer excellent resolution using the laser 
range finding technology. 
 
More modern methods of facility verification combine the use of laser mapping 
technology with radiation imaging.  The integration of a laser scanned image with 
a gamma-ray image projection allows for much more detailed analysis of facility 
construction [3]. Such a methodology enhances the ability of safeguard teams to 
ensure that facility modifications are not clandestine in nature. 
 
More recent work building from the previous example enhances the static 
imagery with a moving photographic imaging and gamma-ray detection system.  
This allows for a greater volumetric survey of the space and can produce near 
real-time imaging of the isotopes in the environment [4].  Use of “Commercial Off 
the Shelf” (COTS) technology has also made combining these technologies 
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when the appropriate integration software is applied.  The use of commercially 
available High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors integrated with the 
Microsoft® X-Box® Kinect™ sensor is one such example of this COTS 
application. 
Process Verification and Isotope Path Confirmation   
Given the macroscopic application of the integrated photographic or laser image 
with the gamma-ray image described in the facility verification section above, a 
follow-on step would practical application of that technology would be the ability 
to verify processes with isotopic precision.  Furthermore, the capacity for 
integrated software and hardware to produce more real-time readouts will make 
process verification practical for safeguards personnel.  Such process verification 
would disable another proliferation pathway and potentially refuse an adversary 
the ability to divert Special Nuclear Material (SNM). 
 
Aqueous reprocessing of used nuclear fuel is a standard method by which 
commercially and industrially useful isotopes are extracted for use by private 
enterprise or for use as new fuel for reactors.  Because of the proliferation 
concern surrounding the disposition of specific isotopes, many safeguards have 
been enacted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  At the 
Rokkashomura Reprocessing Plant (RRP) many such safeguards were designed 
into the facility design, however shortcomings still exist.  The United States 
Department of Energy (USDOE) called for “innovative approaches in process 
monitoring and other safeguards” and suggested that using the facilities own 
instruments to monitor processes would violate the IAEAs policy on joint-use 
equipment [5]. 
 
To maintain accountancy of nuclear material within on significant quantity of 
plutonium (8kg), and to avoid the “joint-use” of equipment, the IAEA has been 
using destructive assay techniques at significant financial cost and time 
expenditure.  To address these concerns, the use of online gamma-ray 
spectroscopy has been simulated to provide a near real-time accountancy of 
process streams.  However, these streams were limited to reporting normal and 
off-normal conditions [6].  These same simulations were later used as the basis 
for several process experiments and while they did demonstrate the ability to 
distinguish normal and off-normal spectra, they still did not integrate any spatial 
isotope visualization into their experiments [7]. 
 
The most recent demonstration of an online process verification technique again 
involved gamma-ray measurements however compared results from before and 
after a process had occurred.  Such a scenario would allow a user to verify input 
and output similarity and compare gross gamma-ray counts and peak ratios for 
isotopic analysis.  Moreover, simple counting procedures like this one are cost 
effective and do not require significant logistical support for continuous operation 
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[8].  The drawbacks of such a system would include a lack of standoff from the 
actual facility architecture and no ability to watch the actual process itself.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Gamma-Ray Detection Before and After Separation Process [8] 
 
Based on the literature research, there is an apparent gap in the current state of 
process monitoring for safeguards purposes.  Currently, methodology is only to 
evaluate a process before and after the actual process occurs.  This can be 
accomplished either with destructive analysis in the post-process or online non-
destructive analysis.  However, what could offer greater certainty in safeguards 
would be a visualization of the actual process itself.  Furthermore, if this process 
could be accomplished with an increased degree of standoff, less interaction with 
the facility architecture would be required by inspection groups. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
 
3.1 Equipment 
 
The isotopes that we used in our experiments were both naturally occurring and 
synthetic.  In general, the synthetic isotopes were substantially more active than 
their natural counterparts.  The synthetic isotopes that were used originated at 
the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL).  The experiments were then conducted at the Radiochemical 
Engineering and Development Center (REDC) with the products of our 
separations used in applications across the United States in both science, 
medicine, and space exploration.  While some of the experiments we observed 
are a weekly occurrence at the REDC, others were decades in the making.  The 
einsteinium experiments we conducted were a decade in the making, and the 
separation was the first conducted using such a capable detection system as the 
one listed below. 
 
While our experiments involved dozens of isotopes, we were able to execute 
each of the trials without changing much of our equipment.  The most crucial 
device in each of our experiments was the gamma-ray detection device.  
Ensuring this device remained constant throughout the trials reduced uncertainty 
as we varied the parameters of the environment it was detecting. 
 
Gamma-Ray Detector 
For each of our four experiments, we used a high purity germanium (HPGe) 
detector produced by PHDS Co., of Knoxville, Tennessee.  The Germanium 
Gamma-ray Imager (GeGI) was the fourth iteration (GeGI v4) of their marketable 
series of mechanically cooled HPGe detectors.  The GeGI has the unique ability 
to both detect the presence of and identify the location of radiological species in 
a four-pi environment.  These localized isotopes are then overlaid on a 
photograph taken directly in front of the detector face.  All radiological signatures 
not forward of the detector face are visible on a white background rather than a 
rearward facing photograph. 
 
The use of an individually portable detection system with such broad abilities 
would make such a detector invaluable to material verification teams operating in 
potentially restrictive environments.  Normally, HPGe (high purity Ge) detection 
systems require the use of a Dewar of liquid nitrogen in order to cool the 
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germanium crystal below 80 degrees Kelvin.  The advantage of the GeGI, and 
other systems using the same mechanical cooling technology, is that no bulky 
Dewar is necessary to ensure the sustained operation of the detector crystal.  
Contrastingly, while other gamma-ray detection systems, like Sodium Iodide 
(NaI), do not require cooling, their energy spectrum resolution cannot easily 
compete with that of HPGe systems.  
 
During our experiments, we used two systems that reduced the portability of the 
GeGI, however increased the accuracy of our measurements.  First, we used a 
tripod that allowed for the GeGI to remain stable for the duration of our samples.  
Secondly, we used lead collimators, with pinhole apertures between one and five 
millimeters, on the detector face of the GeGI (Figure 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The GeGI v4 with Gray and White Lead Collimator and Black Tripod 
Glove Box Containment Systems 
As our experiments involved isotopes that emitted significant and varied types of 
radiation all of our experiments were conducted in a glove box environment.  The 
glove boxes contained all of the undesirable alpha and beta radiation while still 
allowing the experimentally useful gamma-ray radiation to penetrate the glove 
box plexiglass and subsequently, the detection system. 
 
While the glove boxes did contain the undesirable alpha and beta radiation, there 
were some challenges involved in using these containment systems.  Primarily, 
there have been dozens of other experiments conducted in the glove boxes that 
we used for our experiment.  This reality has allowed unwanted background to 
collect in the boxes.  While we attempted to minimize this with good 
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housekeeping procedures, our experiments will have elevated background 
radiation from both glove box contamination and our proximity to other active 
experiments in the surrounding glove boxes.  The second challenge that glove 
boxes presented was the need to position the detector in a manner that enabled 
us to collect a photograph and minimally shielded gamma-ray emissions.  This 
unobstructed placement requirement was also hindered by the need to ensure 
that the laboratory technician could safely and effectively perform the operation 
that we were witnessing.  Figure 3.2 below shows the need to balance the ability 
of the detector to see the operation and the ability of the technician to access the 
gloves in the left most glove box. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Typical Glove Box Setup for Chemical Separation 
 
Columns for Species Separation 
While we conducted three separations, only two different column resins were 
needed.  Both the actinium – radium separation and the americium – neptunium 
– plutonium separation used BioRad® MP-1 100-200 mesh.  Contrastingly, the 
einsteinium – berkelium separation used Dowex® 50W-X8 resin bed.   
 
The physical columns for the experiments also varied based on the isotopes in 
question.  The actinium – radium separation as well as the einsteinium – 
berkelium separation used a narrow diameter glass column.  However, the 
volume of the material involved in the americium – neptunium – plutonium 
separation required the use of a larger diameter glass column.  The differences 
and similarities regarding the columns may be seen in figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: Setup of three unique experiments 
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3.2 Methodology for Species Separation 
 
Column Control Operator 
Each of our three experiments was executed by a trained laboratory technician 
using a set process algorithm.  This individual controlled the pace of the 
experiment in order to meet the stated production timeline and goals.  While the 
detector operator could make requests to move items around the glove box or 
wait to move to the next part of the chemical separation, the overall process was 
always under the control of the column operator who was conducting the 
separation for a specific customer.  This level of rigidity was based on which 
isotopes were being separated, however because of the time restrictions placed 
on the medical isotope separation (actinium – radium), that experiment had little 
room for special requests. 
Detector Operator 
The detector operator was tasked with ensuring that the GeGI was collected data 
as designed.  This involved saving the data collected at specified intervals to 
ensure a time progression could be shown following the completion of the 
experiment.  The detector operator also was required to note the distance from 
the detector face to the column in order to compensate for the camera/detector 
parallax. 
Radiation Control Technician (RCT) 
During the course of our experiments, the team received dose from both neutron 
and gamma-ray radiation.  Prior to each experiment, approval was required to 
execute these separations from the RCT overseers.  To mitigate the radiation 
dose risks, thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and electronic pocket 
dosimeters (EPDs) were worn throughout the operation.  Radioactive waste was 
also created and was disposed of through appropriate channels when cleared by 
the appropriate RCT. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
EXPERIMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR 
MATERIAL PROCESSING METHODS 
 
 
Three of our experiments began with a similar starting point in which a mixture of 
radioactive elements was separated into various fractions.  These experiments 
had the with the goal of isolating an isotope of interest from the remaining 
fractions.  While these radiochemical separations were of great interest to our 
research, the purpose of the separation itself was to isolate one or more isotopes 
for sale to a customer. 
 
4.1 Einsteinium – Berkelium Separation Column 
 
In order to test our hypothesis that our gamma-ray detection and visualization 
system, the GeGI, was able to witness, in real time, the separation of differing 
isotopes, we executed our first experiment using isotopes of significant activity.  
A mixture of einsteinium, berkelium, and californium was used to achieve the 
significant level of activity.  The isotopic mixture was loaded on to the resin and 
the GeGI was allowed to collect gamma-ray signatures over the course of 
roughly 2.5 hours (9124 seconds).  During this collection, the detector was able 
to identify the location of the isotopic mixture within the vial (figure 4.1), noting 
that the berkelium appeared well distributed within the liquid in the vial. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Initial Isotopic Mixture (253Es – 249Bk) 
 12 
 
Following this initial collection, our team attempted a separation of the isotopic 
mixture with the goal of collecting a purified sample of 253Es.  While purifying the 
we were able to note the physical movement of the 249Bk gamma-ray lines 
throughout the process (Figure 4.2).  While we were unable to verify the 
presence of any isotopes remaining in the column, we could track the movement 
of those isotopes throughout the glovebox.  The process took slightly over one 
hour (3976 seconds).   
 
 
Figure 4.2: Tracking Movement of Isotopic Mixture 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the prominent gamma-ray energies peaks emitted by the 
berkelium that allowed for position tracking the isotope as it moved around the 
glove box.  Of note, during these experiments, the GeGI was able to identify both 
the presence and location of the berkelium isotope between 16 and 23 seconds 
after activation.  This was possible for several reasons including proximity to the 
source, the high activity of the isotopes being observed, and finally higher 
energies of the gamma-ray emissions.  Both einsteinium and berkelium have 
short half-lives making them significant sources of gamma-ray energy, however 
their SNM counterparts are much longer lived which presents a much lower 
activity scenario.  Furthermore, the gamma-ray energies emitted by SNM are 
significantly lower than was studied in this experiment and will make imaging 
those isotopes a greater challenge using Compton imaging techniques.  
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Figure 4.3: Gamma-Ray Spectrum for Es – Bk Experiment 
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While we were able to observe the movement of the mixture around a glovebox 
using high activity isotopes, we were unable to witness the separation of the 
isotopic mixture.  This unobserved component of the process was one of the 
requirements to demonstrating the GeGI’s ability to verify separation processes 
from a standoff distance, without the need for process interruption for classical 
alpha decay testing.  Challenges faced during this experiment included a novice 
level of understanding of the GeGI’s full spectrum of capabilities, a limited 
physical window from which to view the execution of the separation, and the 
limited reproducibility of this experiment due to a low quantity of einsteinium 
available.  
 
4.2 Actinium – Radium Separation Column 
 
One of the challenges that we noticed during our einsteinium – berkelium 
experiment was a lack of overall resolution after the separation began.  To better 
test or detector’s ability to isolate the movement of isotopes within a column we 
executed another separation involving small distances.  We also began to move 
closer to the gamma-ray emissions expected of SNM by using lower activity 
sample with less energetic gamma-rays.   
 
This separation would focus on medically useful isotopes and would only 
examine the final portion of the diagram in Figure 4.4.   
 
 
Figure 4.4: ORNL Ac – Ra Separation Flow Diagram [9] 
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In this process, the separation would attempt to purify a sample of actinium-225 
(225Ac) for use in the treatment of cancer.  In order to accomplish this, the 
actinium daughters and other non-necessary isotopes would be removed 
allowing for the capture of purified 225Ac to be collected.  This particular 
experiment was very time sensitive as shipment of the collected actinium was 
scheduled for only a few hours after the start of the separation.  Given this time 
constraint, accurate measurements were a necessity as the separation would not 
be available for some time and the process could not be slowed in any significant 
way. 
 
In our experiment we were able to witness, from roughly a meter standoff 
distance, the detector’s ability to expertly identify isotopes, track the movement of 
isotopes, and maintain excellent spatial resolution over the course of our 
experiment (Figure 4.5).  The entire measurement took roughly one hour (3624 
seconds) from our first measurement to our final measurement.  The gamma-ray 
spectrum emitted by these isotopes is recorded in figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Improved Spatial Resolution of Detection 
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Figure 4.6: Gamma-Ray Spectrum for Ac – Ra Experiment 
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Furthermore, as verification of the detector’s ability to identify isotopes both in 
front of and behind the detector, we moved the sample from the GeGI’s forward 
field of view to the device’s rear at a distance of roughly three meters.  The GeGI 
was able to detect the movement and isolate the location even without a 
collimator or photograph available in that direction (Figure 4.7).  One can see that 
the two gamma-ray peaks identified in the rear-view correlate with francium-221 
(Auto:216) and bismuth-213 (Auto:440). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Catchment Vessel Transfer to Rear of Detector 
4.3 Plutonium – Neptunium – Americium Separation Column 
 
With our final experiment, we had the goal of putting all of the elements of 
previous experiments together into one final isotopic separation.  The mass of 
isotopic mixture used was several hundred times smaller than industrial scale, 
however 1.96 grams of Plutonium 239 (239Pu), 5.74 grams of Neptunium 237 
(237Np), and 13 milligrams of Americium 241 (241Am) were on hand for this 
scaled experiment.   
 
In the event this experiment was also conducted in an effort to date the 
Plutonium contained within the mixture, this could be accomplished through an 
application of the “Bateman Equations” (Figure 4.8) and known decay chains. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Bateman Equation for Isotope Creation and Decay [10] 
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The known decay chains of plutonium isotopes are shown in Figure 4.9.  The 
experimental setup for this separation is shown in figure 4.10 and contains all of 
the isotopes identified in the beginning of the section. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Plutonium Decay Chains 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Loaded Column Prior to Separation Attempt 
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This experiment however was not naturally aged plutonium therefore no aging 
calculations would be worthwhile in this scenario.  Our isotopic mixture was 
doped with its americium and neptunium instead of allowing the negligible mass 
of plutonium-241 (241Pu) to decay into 241Am and subsequently 237Np. 
 
This separation would attempt to show evidence to determine the plausibility of 
using a gamma-ray detection system to provide a means of standoff detection 
and process verification in nuclear safeguards.  Success for this exercise would 
be based on our ability to show that in real time we could witness the extraction 
of 241Am from the other isotopes which pose a proliferation concern.  Figure 4.11 
shows the relative location of all isotopes prior to the separation phase of the 
experiment.  The gamma-ray spectrum emitted by these isotopes is recorded in 
figure 4.12. 
   
 
Figure 4.11: Isotopes Locations Within the Column Prior to Extraction 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Gamma-Ray Spectrum Prior to Extracting Isotopes 
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As our separation progressed, we noticed the successful extraction of the 241Am 
while verifying the 237Np and 239Pu remained in suspension (Figures 4.13 and 
4.14).  The overwhelming 59.5 keV peak shown in the previous figure is 
beneficial in ensuring the successful extraction of the 241Am.   
 
Subsequent alpha particle analysis showed that 99.23% of the 241Am was 
extracted without the removal of SNM isotopes.  The gamma-ray spectrum 
emitted by these isotopes without the 241Am contamination is recorded in figure 
4.15. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Beginning of Americium Extraction 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Verification of 241Am Extraction and SNM Suspension 
 
 21 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Gamma-Ray Spectrum Following Extraction of 241Am 
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Of note, during these separations, there was ingrowth of protactinium-233 
(233Pa).  There were both benefits and drawbacks to this ingrowth.  The primary 
benefit was that the 233Pa could help show where its parent 237Np was radiating 
from.  However, it did offer a challenge of creating several conflicting gamma-ray 
energies that could mask both 237Np and 239Pu since those isotopes are far more 
long-lived than 233Pa which a half-life of only 27.4 days.  With only gram 
quantities of both 237Np and 239Pu, the non-conflicting gamma-ray lines were 
hidden within the gamma-ray background.  Figure 4.16 shows the spectrum used 
to locate the 237Np and 239Pu. 
 
  
Figure 4.16: Gamma-Ray Spectrum of 237Np (via 233Pa) and 239Pu 
 
The lower energy gamma-ray emissions of the 237Np/233Pa and 239Pu, coupled 
with their relative closeness in energy (95.5 keV and 99.0 keV) did challenge the 
detector in localization.  Figure 4.17 shows the 237Np/233Pa is located towards the 
top of the column and the 239Pu is located towards the bottom.  Figure 4.18 
shows the detector did note the center of concentration of each isotope correctly, 
however did require some interpretation of the 237Np/233Pa location because of 
the “smear” of 237Np/233Pa counts shown in the 239Pu region of the column. 
 
The anticipated order of extraction on this separation was 241Am, 239Pu, and 
237Np/233Pa respectively.  After completion of the entire separation, low 
background alpha particle spectroscopy and gamma-ray spectroscopy showed 
that the 241Am was extracted without notable contamination.  Furthermore, the 
237Np and 233Pa were extracted together.  Contrastingly, while much of the 239Pu 
was extracted without contamination from the 237Np and 233Pa, there was an  
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Figure 4.17: Column Showing Bands of Color and Isotope Locations 
 
 
Figure 4.18: SNM Suspension in Separate Column Locations 
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equal amount of the 239Pu that remained with the 237Np and 233Pa.  This situation 
suggests an efficient extraction of the 241Am, and purity of the 239Pu extracted 
prior to the 237Np and 233Pa coming off the column. 
 
As described previously, this isotopic mixture was doped with significant amounts 
of 237Np which altered the state of secular equilibrium that would most likely exist 
in a properly aged plutonium sample.  While industrial scale operations would 
offer different challenges to measurement, resolving the physical locations of the 
237Np and 239Pu could be less challenging when using more non-conflicting 
gamma-ray energies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1 Applications to In-situ Verification of Radiochemistry 
Processes  
 
In our limited experiments, we were able to demonstrate the capability to monitor 
a process by visually witnessing, in real time, the separation of specific isotopes 
from a mixture of SNM.  Such a system could enhance security of process 
monitoring by providing inspection teams the ability to watch the process and not 
simply the before process and after process comparison.  Such a novel system 
could also allow inspectors with lesser levels of training to observe processes 
with greater confidence and less need to collaborate with outside resources. 
 
While the application of this process monitoring method is useful when evaluating 
outside entities and governments on the truthfulness of their process outcomes, 
this methodology would be equally useful as our own government expands its 
production goals with plutonium purification and casting for the first time in 
decades.  Given the potential loss in personnel experience that would come with 
a long absence in industrial scale plutonium production here in the United States, 
process verification methods such as this one could prove invaluable as 
scientists rediscover these skills or attempt different purification methods. 
 
No matter what the application is however, the user is more result would 
available in real-time as the experiment is occurring and would involve much less 
data interpretation as currently available methods.  Furthermore, visualization of 
processes could help refine procedures and reduce waste, as we better 
understand the physical processes occurring by pairing our current analysis 
methods with the visual data provided with this method. 
 
5.2 Applications to Facility Verification 
 
As discussed earlier in this document, significant progress has been made in 
both static and mobile versions of the stand-off gamma-ray facility verification 
systems.  These roving systems however, appear to have been tested using 
sources emitting higher energy gamma-rays or more active gamma-ray sources 
which tend to be easier for Compton scattering based imagers to isolate and 
localize.  Integrating the system tested in our experiments with a facility 
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verification scenario involving more than one isotope would help verify that these 
systems would be useful in real-world settings. 
 
These facility verification inspections would involve verifying that known facility 
plumbing has not been removed and not additional plumbing has been added.  
Any added plumbing would typically be tested to ensure it is not diverting any 
material from the originally designed intent of the facility.  However, by integrating 
our imaging technique with the facility mapping techniques developed by others, 
a greater level of confidence is obtainable.  In fact, verifying that pipes are 
carrying the exact isotopes that they are permitted to be carrying would be 
possible.  This added level of verification would integrate plumbing verifications 
with isotope diversion prevention.  
 
5.3 Future Work 
 
While our experiments met with some successes, there were many areas 
identified that need greater study.  The challenges presented by SNM and other 
weakly emitting sources requires greater study.  As the SNM we tested tended to 
produce gamma-ray energies below 200 keV, and also tended to have greater 
half-lives than the other non-SNM isotopes we experimented with, our technique 
requires refinement.  While industrial scale manufacture of SNM would produce 
greater quantities of gamma-rays for collection, the stand-off required would be 
greater.  An experimenter could potentially overcome this issue through the use 
of pinhole zoom techniques (changing focal length of the detector) or by 
sacrificing the detector itself to work inside the contaminated area.  Either of 
these techniques would require more time and funding to determine the feasibility 
of either method. 
 
Furthermore, deconvolution of the gamma-ray emissions below 100keV would 
prove useful when working with SNM and other sources that emit lower energy 
gamma-ray signatures.  A deconvolution method might provide a better means to 
isolate peaks that are less prominent than are idea to work with.  However, 
conducting this experiment in an environment of lesser background gamma-ray 
emissions would be useful.  Conversely, collecting data on the background 
gamma-ray spectrum and then subtracting that data from the experimentally 
collected spectrum could offer a less elegant, yet equally effective means of 
reducing unwanted interference. 
 
Undoubtedly, if more research is conducted into this method more challenges 
and opportunities for employment of this technology and technique will present 
themselves.  While the financial and man-hour cost for this research may be 
higher than simply continuing use of our current verification methods, it does 
present the opportunity to improve our separation and verification methods, 
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better secure sensitive radiological material, and reduce the time necessary to 
identify potential security threats.  Each of these benefits warrants additional 
attention, however which requirement is most important will allow us to focus our 
effort on a specific area of research. 
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